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Foreword
Antitrust's Troubled Relations with
Intellectual Property
Daniel J. Giffordt
I. UNCERTAINTY OVER THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST
Throughout most of the history of the antitrust laws, the
relationship between antitrust laws and patent, copyright, and
other intellectual property laws has been a subject of
controversy. The courts have sometimes allowed intellectual
property law to trump antitrust law, and at other times they
have done the opposite. One would think that, given the over
one-hundred-year period the Sherman Act has been on the
books, the relationships between these two sets of laws would
be settled by now. Yet, as recent litigation in the Federal,
Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits demonstrates, the
antitrust/intellectual property interface remains as troubled
and unsettled as ever.I
One might also think that the present uncertainties about
the proper relations between antitrust and intellectual
property laws could be resolved by examining the purposes of
these two sets of laws. Yet the fact that the courts have never
been able to determine the proper relationships between these
laws is enough to give a scholar pause before undertaking such
t Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota.
1. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 62-64 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001); In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust
Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-29 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143
(2001); Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195,
1218 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that the lack of boundaries placed on lawsuits
based on unilateral conduct will result in a reduced incentive to risk the costs
associated with innovation, and that effect is contrary to the purposes of
intellectual property and antitrust laws, which are designed to encourage
innovation).
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an examination. Perhaps the difficulties that the legal system
has experienced in relating these two sets of laws to one
another lie in our inability to discern the purposes behind one
or both sets of laws.
II. THE PURPOSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ANTITRUST: WHAT DO WE KNOW?
A. THE PURPOSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
We all know, or think we know, something about the
purposes of the laws governing intellectual property.
Intellectual property laws exist to remedy what would
otherwise be a market failure. Intellectual property laws bring
invention and artistic creativity into the property rights
regime, and confer economic incentives upon inventors and
artists that are analogous to those operating in the general
commercial marketplace. 2
That is not to say that intellectual property justifications
are necessarily all economic ones. We know that there is a
prominent strain of Continental European thought, beginning
with Kant and Hegel, that locates a justification for the social
institution of private property in its connection with
personality.3  We know that this strain of thought has
influenced the Continental approach to intellectual property.
Yet, in the Anglo-American tradition, it is the economic
approach that has been predominant. The philosophical father
of this tradition is probably John Locke, who believed that
what one creates should belong to the creator.4 Later, Adam
Smith provided us with an elaborate theory of how the property
system generates wealth.5 The intuition underlying Smith's
2. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
150-51 (1988); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
432 (1983); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980); Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
3. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV.
281, 290 (1970) (discussing Kant); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330-44 (1988) (discussing Hegel); see
also Miranda Oshige McGowan, Property's Portrait of a Lady, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1037, 1046-50 (2001) (describing Hegel's approach to private property).
4. See JOHN LOcKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305-06
(Cambridge University Press, 1960) (1698).
5. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
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theory, however, was widely appreciated long before he
committed it to paper. Indeed, the ability of private property to
generate economic incentives was both appreciated in and
incorporated into the intellectual property laws of seventeenth
and eighteenth century England. The seventeenth century
English legislation on patents6 and the eighteenth century
English legislation on copyrights7 were both premised upon the
understanding that intellectual property rights would generate
incentives to creativity. 8 The Patent and Copyright Clause of
the U.S. Constitution 9 -a provision written only eleven years
after the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations-
explicitly recognizes the incentive effects of intellectual
property and ensures that the rationale of American patent and
copyright law will remain an instrumental one: that the
protection these laws afford will be justified by their incentive
effects. 10
B. THE PURPOSES OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Do we know as much about the purposes of our antitrust
laws as we do about our intellectual property laws? Perhaps,
and then again, perhaps not. An array of scholars has
attempted to divine Congress's objectives in enacting the
Sherman Act. Robert Bork, examining the debates, concludes
that the Sherman Act was designed to promote efficiency.1"
6. An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws
and Forfeitures Thereof (Statute of Monopolies), 1623, 21 Jac. I, c. 3 (Eng.).
7. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of
Printed Books in the Author's or Purchasers of Such Copies, During the Times
Therein Mentioned (Statute of Anne), 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
8. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the
Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 909, 912-
16 (2002).
9. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Ochoa & Rose, supra note 8, at 922-28.
10. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
150-51 (1988) ("The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted
bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and
nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right
to practice the invention for a period of years."); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studies, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) ("'The immediate effect
of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an "author's" creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for
the general good.'" (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932))).
11. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978); Robert H.
Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7
(1966) (noting that "the policy the courts were intending to apply is the
1697
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Many observers are suspicious of that conclusion, however,
because efficiency may not have been a widely recognized social
objective in 1890.12 Rudolf Peritz, reading the same material,
concludes that Congress drafted the Sherman Act to protect
small businessmen. 13 Robert Lande believes that Congress was
motivated by a desire to protect consumers from monopoly
pricing. 14
It is not surprising that there is a wide diversity of views
among these scholars. The Act itself is phrased in broad and
delphic terms. Additionally, an array of sentiments was
expressed in the congressional debates. Many legislators
feared the emergence of very large business firms in the
American economy. Many feared for the welfare of the small
business owners who were increasingly threatened by the
efficiencies or the aggressive tactics of their larger rivals.
Early judicial decisions reflected the widespread
uncertainties about the purposes behind the Sherman Act and
the other antitrust laws. Initially, the Supreme Court
construed the Sherman Act to condemn even restraints that
were considered reasonable at common law. 15 The Court later
reversed course, however, adopting the so-called rule of reason
in 1911.16
maximization of wealth or consumer want satisfaction").
12. Barbara Fried's assertion that marginal analysis was widely accepted
in the economics profession by 1890 is not necessarily inconsistent with Robert
Lande's belief that members of Congress were unfamiliar with the concept of
allocative efficiency. Compare BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT
ON LAISSEZ FAIRE 127 (1998), with Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation
Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 88 (1982).
13. RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA 1888-1992,
at 15 (1996).
14. Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 871, 899-901 (1999); Lande, supra note 12, at 70.
15. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 575 (1898);
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-28 (1897)
(stating that the Sherman Act condemns "every contract or combination in
restraint of trade" and its prohibition "is not limited to that kind of contract
alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade").
16. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-80 (1911). After adopting
the rule of reason, the Court wrestled with the meaning of unreasonableness.
Justice Brandeis, in a classic description of the rule of reason, asserted that
the rule required an elaborate inquiry. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). It was decades before Brandeis's wide-ranging rule-
of-reason inquiry was widely understood to be largely satisfied by a showing
1698 [Vol 87:1695
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Judge Learned Hand, in his 1945 Alcoa opinion, 17
embraced the view that the Sherman Act and other antitrust
acts were designed to foster small and locally owned
businesses.' 8  He thus incorporated some significant
distributional concerns into the Act. Judge Hand thought that
an economy composed of small business firms was preferable to
an economy of large firms, even if the former operated at a
higher level of cost. Inconsistently, however, he ruled that a
firm would be justified in achieving monopoly status, so long as
the monopoly was "thrust upon" it as a result of the firm's
efficiencies. 19
Judge Hand's thoughts on industrial organization were
essentially repeated in the Supreme Court's Brown Shoe
opinion in 1962.20 This was the Court's first opportunity to
construe the 1950 amendment to the Clayton Act's merger
provisions. The Court ruled that the cost savings generated by
eliminating a step in the distribution chain, while beneficial to
society, should nonetheless be condemned because the merged
company's enhanced efficiency would put unintegrated small
retailers at a competitive disadvantage. 21 During the 1960s,
the Court condemned every merger brought before it. Yet, it
failed to identify a consistent underlying theory on which to
base its decisions. 22
Indeed, it was only in the mid-1970s that the Court began
to follow the microeconomic approach to antitrust law
commonly referred to as the Chicago-school approach. Many
observers believe that the Court switched gears in 1974 with its
decisions in General Dynamics and two bank-merger cases.23
that output in the general market was restricted to a level less than it would
be in a competitively structured market. See FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468
U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
17. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
18. Id. at 428-29 (supporting the belief that "great industrial
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic
results").
19. Id. at 429-30.
20. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
21. Id. at 344.
22. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The sole consistency that I can find is that in
litigation under § 7, the Government always wins.").
23. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974);
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United
States v. Conn. Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
1699
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At least by its 1977 decision in GTE Sylvania,24 the Court had
apparently come to embrace an efficiency approach to antitrust
law.25 Yet, the Court's adherence to efficiency has not been
consistent. Although it has repeatedly insisted that per se
rules should condemn only behavior that is always or almost
always anticompetitive, 26 the Court has not always followed its
own admonitions. We continue to have per se rules that are
overbroad or cannot be justified by efficiency concerns. 27 Cases
such as Aspen Skiing28 and Eastman Kodak29 do not easily fit
an efficiency model, and may be better explained on populist
grounds or on the basis of a special concern for fair dealing with
competitors. Despite these occasional deviations from the
efficiency paradigm, however, that paradigm has brought a
new predictability to the antitrust laws that they previously
lacked.
Even though the Court is commonly described as following
a Chicago-school approach to the antitrust laws, there remains
ambiguity in identifying the laws' purposes. Neither the courts
nor the antitrust enforcement authorities has spoken precisely
on the underlying purposes of the antitrust laws. 30 The Court
has several times announced that the purpose of the antitrust
laws is to advance consumer welfare.31 What that means,
24. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
25. See id. at 58 (overturning precedent imposing a per se prohibition on
vertical restrictions because there had been no showing that the restrictions
always hinder competition).
26. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988);
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468
U.S. 85, 100 (1984); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
27. The per se rule condemning vertical price-fixing agreements appears
to be overbroad to the extent that the rule applies in circumstances where
there are no cartels or oligopolies whose anticompetitive pricing could be
reinforced through vertical price-fixing agreements. Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. at 725-27. The per se rule condemning tying arrangements appears to be
unwarranted for reasons set forth in Justice O'Connor's opinion in Jefferson
Parish. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585
(1985).
29. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
30. See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Alternative National Merger
Standards and the Prospect for International Cooperation, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 208, 218-23 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy
& James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
31. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. at 107; Ariz. v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 367 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Reiter v.
1700 [Vol 87:1695
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however, is unclear. Indeed, when Justice Burger stated in
Sonotone that the antitrust laws were a "consumer welfare
prescription," he referenced Bork's Antitrust Paradox as
authority.32 Bork used the phrase "consumer welfare" in
Antitrust Paradox as equivalent to a combination of consumer
surplus and producer surplus. 33 Bork's analysis followed Oliver
Williamson who had previously argued that a transaction
should be deemed consistent with the antitrust laws if it
generated efficiencies that exceeded the deadweight social loss
generated by a monopolistic restriction of output.34 Although
Williamson employed the conventional language of welfare
economists to make his point, Bork's repetition of the
Williamson analysis employed the "consumer welfare" phrase
to refer to the combination of producer and consumer surplus. 35
Did Burger mean that the antitrust laws seek the total welfare
of society as Bork would argue? Or, did Burger mean that the
antitrust laws seek to maximize the welfare of consumers as a
class and, thus, to preference consumer welfare over producer
welfare?
A number of the lower courts appears to believe that the
antitrust laws contain a distributional element: that a
transaction must produce some benefit to consumers as a class
in order to pass muster under antitrust analysis. 36 That
position, of course, has long been argued by Robert Lande.37
The Justice Department's merger guidelines 38 are ambiguous
on this issue, however. Do they incorporate a consumer welfare
approach in the narrow sense with Lande or in a broad sense
with Bork? There is some ground for believing that the merger
guidelines were moving towards a total surplus approach
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
32. Reiter, 442 U.S. at 343.
33. BORK, supra note 11, at 107-10.
34. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The
Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 33-34 (1968); see also Oliver E.
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
699, 706-09 (1977).
35. BORK, supra note 11, at 107-10.
36. Some of the merger decisions have discussed how much of the merger-
generated cost savings would likely be passed on to consumers, thus
suggesting a consumer surplus rather than a total surplus norm. See FTC v.
Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp 2d. 34, 62 (D.D.C. 1998); FTC v. Univ.
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991).
37. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
38. Merger Guidelines-1992 (With April 8, 1997, Revisions to Sec. 4 on
Efficiencies), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 91 13,104 (Dep't Justice & FTC).
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during the Reagan and the first Bush administrations. The
amendment to the efficiency provisions of the guidelines during
the Clinton administration, however, suggests a shift towards a
consumer surplus approach. Yet, at no time have the
enforcement agencies been forthright about their position on
this issue. 39
Perhaps the historically troublesome relations between
intellectual property and antitrust laws can be explained by the
Court's periodic revisions of its approach to the purposes of
antitrust law. Sometimes the Court has construed antitrust
law from a populist perspective. Sometimes it has treated it as
a mandate to protect small business. More recently, the Court
has construed the antitrust laws as embracing an efficiency
norm. Yet even today, we must leave open the question of
whether the efficiency norm underlying antitrust laws is one
that seeks to maximize consumer surplus or one that seeks to
maximize total surplus. My colleague David McGowan believes
(as I do) that the reconciliation of antitrust and intellectual
property laws would be aided if the courts would construe the
antitrust laws as intended to maximize total surplus. 40
III. ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
FOCUS OF CONFLICT
Where do the antitrust laws and the intellectual property
laws come into contact? Historically, they have come into
contact most frequently where sellers or lessors have sought to
tie one product or service to another. Recall back in 1914 when
Congress in section 3 of the Clayton Act conditionally forbade
the tying of one commodity to another, it included in its
prohibition the modifying phrase "whether patented or
unpatented."41 Congress placed that language in the Clayton
Act's anti-tying provision because it wanted that provision to
apply to the leases of the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation-leases that had been defended by Louis Brandeis
39. See Robert M. Vernail, One Step Forward, One Step Back: How the
Pass-On Requirement for Efficiencies Benefits in FTC v. Staples Undermines
the Revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines Efficiencies Section, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 133, 133-34 (1998); Gregory J. Werden, An Economic
Perspective on the Analysis of Merger Efficiencies, 11 ANTITRUST 12, 13-14
(Summer 1997).
40. David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust
Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 730, 740, 784-85 (2001).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2000).
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acting as counsel to that company-which required lessees to
obtain all their additional requirements of shoe machinery from
that company.42
The phrasing of section 3 of the Clayton Act marked
merely the beginning of a long and complex relationship
between antitrust laws and patent, copyright, and other
intellectual property laws. Congress inserted the quoted
language in section 3 to prevent the courts from excusing
otherwise unlawful tying because the tying product itself was
patented. Congress, in other words, wanted the antitrust laws
to apply in the same fashion, regardless of the patented nature
of the product involved. The existence of a patent was not to
count for or against antitrust liability. In other contexts, the
courts would later use the patented nature of a product as a
means of condemning behavior that otherwise might be lawful.
On other occasions, the courts have used the patented nature of
a product to excuse behavior that, in the absence of the patent,
would be unlawful-an approach that Congress sought to
forestall in its phrasing of section 3 of the Clayton Act. Indeed,
the courts have exhibited a schizophrenic attitude towards
intellectual property, sometimes allowing intellectual property
rights to trump antitrust laws and sometimes doing exactly the
opposite.
We might begin our inquiry into the reasons for this
inconsistency with a look at a simple tying arrangement. Take
the now-famous case in which the Justice Department
successfully challenged the practice of the International
Business Machines Company (IBM) that required lessees of its
early computers to purchase the punched cards needed to run
the machines from IBM.43 Later critics of that decision pointed
out that IBM may have used sales of the punched cards as a
price discrimination mechanism. IBM could, through sales of
punched cards whose prices were marked up substantially over
their costs, charge higher prices to customers who used
computers intensively (and therefore probably placed a high
value on them) and lower prices to customers who used them
42. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS A FREE MAN'S LIFE 215-19
(Viking Press 1946).
43. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 140 (1936)
(finding no justification for imputing an exception to the Clayton Act that
would allow IBM to protect its good will through monopolistic means where
alternative companies were capable of producing equally effective punch
cards).
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less intensively (and therefore probably valued them less).44
Indeed, it would be in IBM's interest (if it could) to use the tie
to charge each customer its reservation price. If it did, IBM
would be acting as a perfectly discriminating monopolist, both
maximizing its profits and expanding its production as it sold
to each customer at its reservation price.
Those who, like Lande, view the antitrust laws as
protecting consumers from monopoly pricing would be offended
by IBM's attempt to replicate the behavior of a perfectly
discriminating monopolist. They would view price
discrimination as anticompetitive and hence unlawful. Others
who, like Williamson and Bork, view the antitrust laws as
designed to foster efficiency would see IBM's price-
discrimination as reducing or eliminating the social waste that
ordinarily is generated by a single-price monopolist (i.e., a
monopolist that does not engage in price discrimination). They
would tend to view a monopolist's practice of price
discrimination as a social benefit (and hence as lawful), if it
encouraged the monopolist to expand its output beyond the
level that would be optimum for a single-price monopolist.
These differences in approach were more recently reflected in
the several opinions accompanying the Supreme Court's
decision in Jefferson Parish v. Hyde.45 The plurality opinion
identifies price discrimination as one of the evils of tying.46
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion observes that tying
sometimes promotes efficiency.47
It may be, however, that when we speak of the
antitrust/intellectual property interface we both correctly
identify the problem we wish to consider and obscure it. The
interaction of antitrust laws with intellectual property laws
may not be problematic. Rather, it may be the dimensions of
intellectual property itself-as measured and defined by
intellectual property laws themselves-that are the source of
the trouble. I attempt to show this below. If I am correct that
the source of the problem lies in the judicial constructions of
the dimensions of intellectual property law, then the problem
lies in large part, not in uncertainty over the purposes of the
antitrust laws, but in uncertainty over the precise objectives of
44. See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 384-87 (1985).
45. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984).
46. Id. at 15.
47. Id. at 40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1704 [Vol 87:1695
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the intellectual property laws themselves.
IV. THE OBJECTIVES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW RECONSIDERED
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Motion Picture
Patents,48 the courts have imported competition policy into
intellectual property laws. Yet, this competition policy has not
necessarily been the same competition policy reflected in
antitrust laws. In Motion Picture Patents, the Court refused to
enforce a condition imposed by a patentee upon the use of its
invention.49 The patentee had sought, by a licensing condition
attached to its patented device for feeding motion-picture film
to projectors, to limit its use to films authorized by the
patentee. 50 In refusing to give effect to the condition imposed
by the patentee, the Court referenced the social policy it
believed to have been incorporated in the Clayton Act's anti-
tying provisions. 51 The Court did not apply the Clayton Act to
the transaction before it, but rather incorporated its
understanding of the competition policy contained in the
Clayton Act into the parameters of patent law. 52 The Court
said that nothing in patent law gives a patentee the right to
condition the use of a patented invention with goods selected by
the patentee.53 Therefore, the validity of the condition must be
judged by the general law. Nothing in the general law
authorizes such conditions upon use. Indeed, the common law
had traditionally invalidated such restrictions as restraints
upon alienation. The conditions were, therefore, unenforceable.
Later, under the rubric of a new doctrine of patent misuse,
the Court refused to enforce patents that were employed to sell
a second product in a tying arrangement. 54 The Court's
apparent basis for the decision was its desire to import
competition policy into patent law. This incorporation of
48. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917), overruling Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
49. Id. at 506-07.
50. Id. at 503.
51. Id. at 517-18.
52. Id. at 517-18.
53. Id. at 518.
54. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666-67
(1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680,
684 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942);
Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33-34 (1931).
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competition policy into patent law culminated in 1944 in the
Mercoid cases 55 where the Court pushed the logic of its
condemnation of patent-related tying to an extreme length.
The subject of the Mercoid cases were patents for heating
systems. The patentee sold, and licensed others to sell, controls
for the heating systems, but it did not sell the heating system
itself. Rather, customers who purchased the controls were
licensed to use the controls to install the heating system.56 As
the Court saw the arrangement, the patentee used the patent
as a tying product. In order to obtain a license to install the
heating system (the patented tying product), a person was
required to purchase the furnace controls (the tied product).57
The Court did not inquire into whether the controls possessed
any use other than in conjunction with the patented heating
system. The Court found misuse58 and an antitrust violation.59
In the process, the Court undermined the doctrine of
contributory infringement.60
With the wisdom of hindsight, we might say that the
Court's Mercoid decisions were mistakes. If the controls were
usable only in the patented heating system, then there is a one-
for-one relationship between a sale of the controls and the
issuance of a license for the heating system. Both because the
controls were usable only in the heating system and because of
the fixed one-for-one relationship between the heating system
and the controls, the patentee's method of marketing its
product (the license plus the controls) could not have added to
the patentee's power. There was, in fact, no adverse effect on
competition in the marketplace.
Scholars probing into the economic consequences of tying
arrangements would later show that ties involving fixed
55. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. at 661; Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. at 680.
56. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. at 663.
57. Id. at 666-67.
58. Id. at 668.
59. Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. at
684.
60. Mercoid Corp., 320 U.S. at 669. Contributory infringement involves
the furnishing of an essential component of a patented product to a direct
infringer who uses that component to construct the patented product. Section
271 of the patent act provides that the sale of a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use does not constitute
contributory infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
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proportions cannot expand the power of the seller.61 Nor would
those ties have any adverse consequences on competition at all.
Years before these scholarly critiques emerged, however,
Congress took it upon itself to correct what it perceived as
errors in the Mercoid decisions. In the Patent Act of 1952,
Congress declared that it was not misuse for a patentee to tie a
patent license to the sale of a product whose only use was with
the patent.62 In 1988, Congress further defined misuse. The
1988 amendments explicitly permit patentees to refuse
licenses.63 These amendments also permit a patentee lacking
market power to tie staple commodities to a patented product
or license, thus incorporating the prevailing antitrust standard
into the parameters of the misuse doctrine. 64  These
congressional efforts to merge the standards for patent misuse
with antitrust standards were aided, during the last two
decades, by decisions in the Federal Circuit that require a
showing of anticompetitive effect before applying the patent
misuse doctrine. 65
In the 1990s, the lower courts developed anew a doctrine of
copyright misuse, one that is expressly modeled upon the
judicially developed patent misuse doctrine.66 The courts that
applied this doctrine appeared to take as their model the patent
misuse doctrine as it existed prior to its congressional
modification. Under this new copyright doctrine, it is misuse to
use a copyright to effect a tie, or indeed to enter into a contract,
61. See BORK, supra note 11, at 375-81; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 172-74 (1976); Ward S. Bowman Jr., Tying Arrangements and the
Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 36 (1957); M. L. Burstein, A Theory of
Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 93-95 (1960); Aaron Director &
Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. L. REV.
281, 292 (1956).
62. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 28, 66 Stat. 811, § 271.
63. Pub. L. No. 100-703, Title II, § 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000)).
64. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000).
65. See Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868-69 (Fed. Cir.
1997); B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426-27 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
For a discussion of these cases, see Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (and Fall?)
of the Patent Misuse Doctrine in the Federal Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 669,
675-84 (2002).
66. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 792-95 (5th
Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt. Info. Co. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516, 520-21
(9th Cir. 1997); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976-77 (4th
Cir. 1990).
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for the exclusive supply of a copyrighted product. 67 There is
some suggestion in the case law that a refusal to license could
constitute misuse.68 The decisions make clear the divergence
between the copyright misuse doctrine and the standards of
antitrust law. There is, for example, no rule-of-reason analysis
applied in a determination of misuse.69
The judicial attempt to incorporate competition policy into
the intellectual property laws, thus, continues apace. During
the period from 1917 to 1944, we saw the judiciary
progressively inserting competition policies-in the form of
anti-tying policies-into the patent law. In the 1990s, the
judiciary has been inserting competition policies into the
copyright law. Questions remain as to what objectives the
courts seek as they incorporate competition policies into the
intellectual property laws. Are they seeking the same
objectives as the antitrust laws? As competition policies are
incorporated into the intellectual property laws, the
parameters of these laws are being redrawn. It is appropriate,
therefore, to inquire into the underlying rationale of the
intellectual property law modifications that are being
introduced.
V. THE PURPOSES OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAWS: THE JUDICIAL VIEW
A pure incentive model of the intellectual property laws 70
does not explain the inclusion of the strands of competition
policy that the courts have introduced via the misuse doctrine.
Is it possible to describe more precisely the purposes and
parameters of the intellectual property laws in a way that
includes not only their economic-incentive rationales, but also
the elements of competition policy that those laws have
absorbed?
A. PATENT LAW
When the courts (through the mechanism of the misuse
doctrine) introduced elements of competition policy into patent
law between 1917 and 1944, they may have intended to make
67. Practice Mgmt. Info. Co., 121 F.3d at 521.
68. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 n.8 (9th
Cir. 2001).
69. Lasercomb Am., 911 F.2d at 977-78.
70. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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patent law consistent with antitrust law. The Court read the
Clayton Act as enunciating an anti-tying social policy; the
Court then incorporated that policy in its Motion Picture
Patents decision. That basic orientation appears to explain its
later decisions through the Mercoid cases. This approach was
not unreasonable at a time when the courts believed that tying
arrangements in general were devoid of all social virtue.
The larger question remains to be answered: How did the
courts of this time understand the purposes and parameters of
the patent law, as judicially modified through the misuse
doctrine? A plausible answer is that they saw tying as a means
for leveraging power from the tying product to the tied product,
whereby the misuse doctrine was designed to prevent that
leveraging. Courts of this period were sometimes confused
about the actual power of patents. Sometimes they acted as if
patents in themselves conferred economic power. Indeed, we
have already noted that the courts of the 1950s and 1960s
sometimes presumed the existence of economic power from the
very existence of a patent.7' The purposes and parameters of
patent law were then understood by the courts in this way:
Patent law creates a system of economic incentives designed to
foster invention, but the incentive structure of patent law is not
to be augmented by leveraging the power of the patent.
The congressional restrictions upon the misuse doctrine
imposed in 1952 and elaborated in 1988 redefine the kind of
competition policy that can be appropriately introduced into
patent law. In 1952, Congress insisted that there was no
improper leverage when a patentee tied a nonstaple product-
viz., one specially made for use with the patented product and
which has no other use-to the patent or patent license. As
observed above, this congressional position was later vindicated
by scholars studying the economic effects of tying
arrangements. In 1988, Congress elaborated the statutory
provisions governing patent misuse to ensure that misuse could
not be extended beyond the prohibitions on tying then
embodied in the antitrust laws.
B. COPYRIGHT LAW
Just as patent law was redesigned in the first half of the
twentieth century by the judicial introduction of elements of
competition policy, so too copyright law is being redesigned by
71. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
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those courts that have introduced elements of competition
policy into that law via the copyright misuse doctrine. As
redesigned, copyright law now provides an economic incentive
to artists and authors to create literary and artistic works, but
that incentive effect is denied whenever the copyrighted work is
the subject of a tie or an exclusive supply arrangement, or
perhaps whenever the copyright holder refuses to grant a
license.
There is no apparent rationale for these newly introduced
restrictions. The courts apparently believe that, by introducing
restrictions, they are furthering a pro-competitive social policy.
Yet, such a belief would not withstand analysis.72  Most
copyrighted works are in competition with other works.
Painters, even great painters, compete for the attention of
critics, galleries, and collectors. 73 The works of hundreds of
writers fill our bookstores. Composers of serious music
similarly vie for the attention of critics, and popular composers
compete intensely among themselves.
Congress intervened in patent law to ensure that the
competition policies that the courts had incorporated into that
body of law reflected the competition policy embodied in the
antitrust laws. Whether Congress will similarly intervene in
copyright law is unclear. What is certain, however, is that the
competition policies impact copyright law, not from the outside,
but from within. The competition policies that affect the
application of copyright law were created by the courts as a
part of copyright law itself. These policies are contained in the
copyright misuse doctrine.
VI. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS JUST PROPERTY
Would the confusion in the case law be diminished if the
courts were (and were able) to treat intellectual property in the
same way that they treat any property? That was the intent of
Congress in section 3 of the Clayton Act. The law was to be
applied to the tying of commodities in the same way "whether
[they were] patented or unpatented." That direction mirrored
congressional modifications of the patent misuse doctrine, as
72. See Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust /Intellectual Property Interface: An
Emerging Solution to an Intractable Problem, HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming
2003) (discussing the emergence and development of copyright misuse).
73. See Daniel J. Gifford, Innovation and Creativity in the Fine Arts: The
Relevance and Irrelevance of Copyright, 18 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569,
590-99 (2000).
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noted above. In prohibiting a finding of misuse when a patent
was combined or tied to an article having no other use than in
conjunction with the patent, Congress was legitimating
behavior that would not create anticompetitive effects.
Moreover, by requiring that the tie of a staple to a patented
product be deemed misuse only when the patent possessed
market power, Congress was bringing the misuse doctrine into
conformity with prevailing antitrust standards.
How would such an approach affect the results in some of
the most widely discussed recent cases? Observers have been
troubled by the different results in the Federal Circuit's Xerox
decision and the Ninth Circuit's Kodak decision. In the former
case, the Federal Circuit allowed rights under the patent and
copyright law to trump antitrust concerns, 74 while in the latter
case, the Ninth Circuit allowed antitrust law to trump
intellectual property claims.75 Unfortunately, the focus (by
both the courts and by observers) upon the intellectual property
issues probably diverted attention from the alleged restraint
that, in both cases, involved the alleged exercise of power by an
equipment manufacturer over spare parts and manuals
necessary to provide maintenance and repair services.
The underlying issue-whether an equipment seller acts
anticompetitively when it refuses to supply replacement parts
to independent servicing firms offering maintenance and repair
services in competition with the seller of the equipment-has
come before the courts repeatedly during the last decade. The
Supreme Court considered this issue in its Eastman Kodak
decision of 1992, and an array of lower courts have dealt with
that issue since that time.76 Following the Supreme Court's
lead, the courts have concluded that if the servicing market is
not constrained by competition in the equipment market, then
the refusal to supply parts to the independent servicing firms
reduces competition in the servicing market. If the service
market is so constrained, however, then no reduction in
74. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-29 (Fed.
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001).
75. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218-
20 (9th Cir. 1997).
76. SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11 (1st
Cir. 1999); Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195
(9th Cir. 1997); PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 811 (6th
Cir. 1997); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 33 F.3d 194 (3d Cir.
1994); Virtual Maint., Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 11 F.3d 660 (6th Cir.
1993).
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competition results.77 Taking this approach to the problem, the
Sixth Circuit ruled, in one of the leading servicing aftermarket
cases, that because Honeywell had consistently and openly
followed a policy of denying parts to all independent servicing
organizations, its policy was taken into account by the
equipment market. Competition in the equipment market
constrained its behavior in the aftermarket, and hence its
behavior was lawful. 78
Arguably, the Xerox case could have been decided on those
grounds. If the servicing market was constrained by the
equipment market, then Xerox acted lawfully in denying parts
to the independents. If Xerox could show that it had openly
and consistently followed its policy of denying parts to
independents, as Honeywell had done, then the servicing
market would have been constrained by competition in the
equipment market. Xerox would have prevailed and no clash
between intellectual property and antitrust would have
occurred. If the servicing market was not constrained by
competition in the equipment market (say, because Xerox
changed its policy from providing parts to independent
servicing organizations to one of not providing them), then
under the prevailing law Xerox would ordinarily be deemed to
have monopolized. Is it good public policy for the intellectual
property laws to change this result? Critics of the Xerox
decision might ask whether the intellectual property laws
confer a right to trap unwary customers into entering a
dependency relationship, behavior that the Court's Eastman
Kodak decision characterized as both unlawful tying and
monopolization.
The Ninth Circuit's Kodak decision also grappled with a
similar problem, but its decisional approach seems generally
unsatisfactory. Initially, the court said that it would presume
that Kodak's refusal to supply parts was protected by patent
law.79 Then, it upheld a jury verdict against Kodak, reasoning
that the jury considered Kodak's asserted patent justification to
be a pretext for violating the antitrust laws. 80 Allowing the
inferred subjective intent of a patentee to destroy the protection
77. PSI Repair Serus., 104 F.3d at 818; Metzler v. Bear Auto. Serv. Equip.
Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
78. PSI Repair Serv., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 822 (6th Cir.
1997).
79. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d at 1214-15.
80. Id. at 1219-20.
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that it would otherwise receive from the patent law would
undermine confidence in patent law and generate legal
uncertainty. Could the Ninth Circuit have avoided this
problem by treating Kodak's patents as property like any other
property? Had it done so, the court would have inquired into
whether the jury properly found that the equipment market did
not constrain the servicing market. If the equipment market
did not constrain the servicing market, then could the court
have rendered a decision against Kodak without undermining
its patent rights?
Recall that when the aftermarket issue was before the
Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak, it was cast in both tying
and monopolization counts. 81  Yet on remand, the case
proceeded only on the ground of monopolization.8 2 Similarly,
Xerox was litigated as a monopolization case. The reason why
the plaintiffs concentrated on the monopolization count may
have been the vulnerability of the tying claim. Over Kodak's
objection that it was acting purely unilaterally, the Supreme
Court inferred a tie from Kodak's willingness to provide parts
only to aftermarket servicing customers. In doing so, the Court
was not only pressing the limits of what may constitute a tie,
but it was also employing an analysis different from that used
by the lower court.83  If the manufacturer's aftermarket
behavior was unilateral behavior, then the monopolization
clause was where they were most vulnerable.
Thus, it may have been the vulnerability of the defendants
81. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
461-79 (discussing tying); id. at 480-86 (discussing monopolization).
82. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d at 1201.
83. The Eastman Kodak decision is remarkably unclear as to the behavior
that constituted the tie whose lawfulness was the subject of the Court's
opinion. The Court stated in the text of its opinion "that Kodak would sell
parts to third parties only if they agreed not to buy service from ISO's,"
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 463 (1992), and
then in an accompanying footnote restated Kodak's behavior as selling "to
third parties on condition that they buy service from Kodak," id. at 463 n.8.
The Ninth Circuit approached the issue in a slightly different way. That court
read the provision in Kodak's agreement with equipment owners, "that it
[would] sell parts only to users 'who service their own Kodak equipment,'" as
constituting the tie. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d
612, 619 (9th Cir. 1990), affd 504 U.S. 451 (1992). Another circuit court read
the same contractual language as not constituting a tying agreement. Serv. &
Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 686 n.12 (4th Cir. 1992); see
Daniel J. Gifford, The Damaging Impact of the Eastman Kodak Precedent
upon Product Competition: Antitrust Law in Need of Correction, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1507, 1525 (1994).
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to a charge of monopolization (through unilateral behavior) and
their concomitant lack of vulnerability to a charge of tying that
brought the antitrust laws into conflict with the intellectual
property laws. If their behavior could have been characterized
in tying terms, then conflict between antitrust and intellectual
property laws might have been minimized or avoided. From
behavior that Kodak characterized as unilateral, the Supreme
Court inferred a conditional sale: Kodak sold "to third parties
on condition that they buy service from Kodak."84  That
inferred condition comes close to the language in § 271(d)(5),
which indicates that such behavior may be treated as misuse
when performed by a patent owner possessing market power.85
When the antitrust offense is consistent with behavior that
patent law itself treats as misuse, there is no conflict.
Because the cases were litigated on monopolization counts,
however, the defendants' behavior was evaluated as a purely
unilateral refusal to deal. Nothing in the statutory patent
misuse provisions would question the legitimacy of that
unilateral behavior.8 6  Thus, the courts had before them
behavior that would be condemned if performed with
unpatented parts or uncopyrighted manuals. Should the
patented and copyrighted character of these products change
that result? The owners' exclusive control over protected
material goes to the core of intellectual property protection.
The Federal Circuit felt compelled to uphold the right of the
patent and copyright owner to refuse to deal.
It is ironic that the circuit courts were forced to choose
between antitrust law and intellectual property law in these
aftermarket cases. Congress has, over the years, minimized
the differences between the way competition policies impact
intellectual property and the way they affect all other forms of
property. Congress wanted the Clayton Act's anti-tying
provision to be applied in the same way to both patented and
unpatented commodities. Congress's 1952 restrictions on the
patent-misuse doctrine was a conservative one: The restrictions
restored the doctrine of contributory infringement, anticipated
later scholarship, and helped to bring the misuse doctrine into
coherence with subsequently developed antitrust law.
84. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serus., Inc., 504 U.S. at 463 n.8.
85. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2000).
86. Indeed, the Federal Circuit drew support for the legitimacy of the
defendant's unilateral refusal to deal from the provisions of § 271(d)(4) that
expressly authorize a patentee to refuse to license its patent.
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Congress's 1988 amendments to the misuse provisions brought
them even closer to contemporary antitrust case law.
Although the conflict between antitrust law and
intellectual property laws in these cases probably could not
have been avoided, these cases are not likely to be the
forerunners of major new clashes between antitrust and
intellectual property. Typically, intellectual property will not
be treated differently in antitrust contexts from other property.
In Xerox and Kodak, however, the issues were presented in a
way that challenged the courts to recognize the core right of an
intellectual property owner to refuse to deal. Ultimately, the
Federal and Ninth Circuits gave us inconsistent responses.
Under the Federal Circuit's ruling, behavior that would
ordinarily constitute monopolization becomes protected when
the property involved is protected by patent or copyright. The
Ninth Circuit came closer to treating intellectual property in
the same way as other property, but at the expense of a long
recognized, core intellectual property right. Yet, the
significance of this divergence should not be overstated. The
lower courts, after extensive analyses, have determined that
the aftermarket context from which this issue arose raises
antitrust issues only in the rare cases where the primary
equipment market is operating deficiently.
Of course, had Justice Scalia's approach to the Eastman
Kodak issue prevailed, even the conflicts between antitrust and
intellectual property laws exhibited in the decisions of the
Federal and Ninth Circuits would not have arisen. Scalia
believed that the "power" an equipment manufacturer
possesses over equipment customers does not rise to the level of
antitrust concern. Scalia's approach would make it easier to
treat all intellectual property as just another variety of
property. Perhaps the difficulties faced by the circuit courts in
attempting to adjust the conflicting claims of antitrust and
intellectual property laws provide support for Scalia's position.
The Microsoft case is particularly interesting from the
perspective of the antitrust/intellectual property interface,
because it too can be divorced from intellectual property rights.
Despite Microsoft's argument that its behavior was privileged
under copyright, and despite the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals rulings on a number of copyright issues, the relevant
monopoly for antitrust purposes may not have been the
Windows operating system at all. Rather, the relevant
monopoly might be better stated as that operating system's
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interfaces: the application program interfaces (APIs).87 It is
these interfaces that software developers must access, and that
produce the network effects that make them the industry
interface standard.
The APIs, however, are probably not protected by copyright
because they are unprotected "systems of operation" under §
102(b) of the copyright act.88 Even apart from § 102(b), several
copyright fair use cases indicate that APIs are unprotectable as
against software providers that need access to the Windows
operating system. 89 Thus, the issue in the Microsoft antitrust
case might involve the behavior in which that company
engaged to protect its monopoly over the Windows APIs. Since
the Windows APIs were probably not protected by copyright,
the case, so viewed, did not involve the antitrust/intellectual
property interface at all.
The court, of course, did rule that Microsoft acted
unlawfully when it forbade computer manufacturers from
removing the Microsoft browser from its Windows operating
system. 90 This part of the court's ruling could be viewed as an
antitrust court significantly intruding into the domain of
copyright. After all, the ruling effectively took control over a
derivative work from the copyright holder. Yet, the court's
ruling could also be viewed from the premise that copyright
law, in creating rights to remedy a market failure, creates
property rights that are on par (no more, no less) with other
property rights. From that perspective, the court might merely
be dealing with the intellectual property rights of Microsoft as
it would deal with the property rights of any manufacturer in
an integrated product not protected by copyright or other
intellectual property rights.
This is not the first time that the courts have dealt with so-
called technological integration. When the issue is whether a
87. See Daniel J. Gifford, Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of
Standard-Setting Issues Under the Patent, Copyright and Antitrust Laws,
IDEA (forthcoming 2003).
88. Id. (explaining why APIs are "systems of operation"); see also Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813-18 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing
systems of operation), affd by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
89. See Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603-
04 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524-26
(9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
90. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).
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firm restrains competition in the market for a product which is
effectively tied to another principal product, the plaintiff
carries a substantial burden. That was the ruling on the tying
issue in Microsoft where a copyrighted product was the subject
of the litigation.91 That was also the ruling in the technological
integration tying cases of two decades ago (whether they were
cast in tying or monopolization language) involving IBM's
mainframe computers where no intellectual property was
involved.92 These two pieces of litigation show a remarkable
similarity in the treatment of the restraint imposed in the
ancillary market.
Microsoft, of course, also involved a second and quite
different legal issue: whether the steps that Microsoft took to
prevent computer manufacturers from removing the browser
(and thereby reversing that integration.) were a means of
preserving its Windows monopoly. 93 That second issue involved
an unusual form of monopolization: monopoly maintenance.
On this second issue, the court placed the burden of
justification on Microsoft---a burden that Microsoft failed to
carry.94 IBM never faced the issue of monopoly maintenance.
Yet, Microsoft would have been required to justify its
integration-or more precisely, the steps that it took to ensure
that computer manufacturers would not undo that
integration-whether its products (the operating system and
the browser) were or were not protected by copyright. 95 In
short, issues connected with technological integration can be
resolved without regard to whether the integrated product or
any of its components is protected by copyright. Copyright
protections are not undermined when the court affords the
same respect to copyright property as it does to property in
general.
91. Id. at 95 ("[I]t is the plaintiffs burden to show that the
anticompetitive effect of the conduct outweighs its benefit.").
92. See Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188, 1188 (9th Cir. 1980);
Cal. Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 733 (9th Cir. 1979);
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 448 F. Supp. 228, 229 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 342 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.'1975).
93. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 65.
94. Id. at 67.
95. See Daniel J. Gifford, What Is Monopolization Anyway? The D.C.
Circuit Grapples with Some Perplexing Issues, 46 ANTITRUST BULL. 797, 825-
30 (2001) (discussing technological integration).
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CONCLUSION
Sometimes it may be necessary to accord special treatment
to intellectual property in antitrust contexts. The Federal
Circuit did so in Xerox. Nonetheless, Congress has tried to
minimize potential conflict between the policies embodied in
intellectual property laws and those embodied in antitrust
laws. It sought equal treatment of unpatented and patented
commodities under the Clayton Act in 1914. Its restrictions
upon the elements of competition policy that could be
incorporated into the patent misuse doctrine have helped to
bring the competition policies of antitrust laws and the
competition policies of patent laws into closer alignment.
The major arena in which antitrust and intellectual
property policies are currently in substantial conflict involves
the copyright misuse doctrine. That doctrine is a relatively
new judicial creation that the courts assert is modeled upon the
patent misuse doctrine. Yet, the courts have ignored the
congressional interventions that both limited the patent misuse
doctrine, and restructured it to bring it into alignment with
antitrust law. The courts have not yet fully considered the
ramifications of the broad misuse doctrine that they have
created. There may be a place for an independent copyright
misuse doctrine, but the dimensions of that misuse cannot be
taken over bodily from a judicially developed patent law that
Congress has rejected.
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